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LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVING CHILDREN
Robert E. Shepherd, Jr.*
I. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND STATUS OFFENSES
The most notable development this past year in the area of juve-
nile delinquency and noncriminal misbehavior was the passage by
the Virginia General Assembly of legislation modifying the state's
response to status offenses committed by children.' Ever since the
adoption of the revised juvenile code in 1977 there have been ef-
forts at practically every session of the Assembly to modify the
provisions which prohibit the commitment of status offenders to
secure institutions, but the efforts were not successful. However,
the 1987 bill met with little resistance in the legislature.2 The 1987
legislation, effective July 1, 1988, does two very significant things:
first, it redefines the "Child in Need of Services" (CHINS) cate-
gory and creates a new "Child in Need of Supervision" label and,
second, it allows the use of a physically secure detention facility for
incarceration of juveniles for up to a maximum of thirty days for
violating court orders issued pursuant to an initial adjudication.'
Since 1977, the Virginia philosophy has been to offer and pro-
vide services to children engaged in non-criminal misbehavior
outside a correctional setting.4 Many judges and juvenile probation
officers have urged that it is difficult to get youths to participate in
such services, where available, without some leverage on the part
of the court to "hold over the juvenile's head." The 1987 legislation
represents an effort to address that concern. The CHINS category
has been narrowed to include the "child whose behavior, conduct
or condition presents or results in a serious threat to the well-being
* Professor of Law, T. C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; B.A., 1959,
Washington and Lee University; LL.B., 1961, Washington and Lee University.
1. Status offenses are acts that would not be criminal if committed by an adult. For ex-
ample, in Virginia such activities as habitually running away from home, truancy from
school, disobeying parental commands or violating local curfew ordinances expose a child to
being treated as a "Child in Need of Services." VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
2. H. 1219, 1987 Virginia General Assembly.
3. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-228, -292(E) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
4. VIRGINIA ADVISORY LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, SERVICES TO YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS: REVISION
OF THE JUVENILE CODE 12-13, REPORT TO THE GEN. ASSEMBLY OF 1976, S. Doc. No. 19.
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and physical safety of the child . . .,,, while the new "Child in
Need of Supervision" appellation applies to the habitual truant or
habitual runaway.' The dispositional alternatives pursuant to the
new legislation are not significantly different than those which ex-
isted previously, but if the child is fourteen years of age or older
and "willfully and materially" disobeys the court's order of dispo-
sition, the child may be detained in a secure facility for a period of
no more than ten days.7 Subsequent violations of the order may
result in an additional twenty days in detention, with no more
than thirty days incarceration resulting from the same petition."
Despite the overwhelming legislative support for this proposal, it
was by no means uncontroversial. The opposition caused the chief
patron to put the effective date off until July 1, 1988, and a joint
legislative study committee will be addressing the total issue of
CHINS in Virginia prior to the 1988 session of the General Assem-
bly. 9 That study will have to confront the issues of the effects of
"labeling" troubled young people as CHINS, the incarceration of
status offenders in institutions with delinquent youths (even
though the legislation mandates separation of the two), the prob-
lem of the disparate treatment of male and female status offenders
prior to the 1977 code revision, and the difficult question of
whether society is penalizing troubled youth who come from even
more troubled families because of a paucity of services to assist
them in making a healthy adjustment to adolescence.'"
A difficult question was raised by the prosecution of a young
man in Frederick County who was a juvenile at the time he alleg-
edly committed capital murder and robbery but who reached his
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (Cum. Supp. 1987); see Shepherd, Legal Issues Involving
Children: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 903, 915 (1986).
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (Cum. Supp. 1987). The legislature thus left out of both of
the new definitions the habitually disobedient child and the child "who commits an offense
which would not be criminal if committed by an adult. Id. (definitions effective until
July 1, 1988).
7. Id. § 16.1-292(E).
8. Id.
9. H. J. Res. 247, 1987 Virginia General Assembly.
10. See generally J. HANDLER & J. ZATA, NEITHER ANGELS NOR THIEVES: STUDIES IN DEIN-
STITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS (1982); IJA-ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS
PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR (Tent. Draft 1977); L. TEITEL-
BAUM & A. GOUGH, BEYOND CONTROL: STATUS OFFENDERS IN THE JUVENILE COURT (1977); F.
ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE (1982). For a discussion of the char-
acteristics of these young people who were committed to the state prior to the juvenile code
provision, see PROGRAM EVALUATION UNIT, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, STATUS OFFENDERS
IN THE DIRECT CARE OF DIVISION OF YOUTH SERVICES (1976).
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majority prior to the institution of any proceedings. The essential
question was whether the juvenile and domestic relations district
court had "exclusive original jurisdiction" over the youth or
whether the Commonwealth could proceed by direct indictment.
The circuit judge in the case ruled that any proceeding must be
initiated in the juvenile court as that tribunal has exclusive origi-
nal jurisdiction over any "juvenile," and that status is to be deter-
mined by the age of the child at the time the wrongful acts are
committed." The Virginia Attorney General reinforced this con-
clusion in an official opinion that the juvenile court has exclusive
original jurisdiction over a youth who committed an act prior to
turning eighteen. The opinion went further by stating that the
court's jurisdiction would be divested if the youth reached the age
of twenty-one prior to any proceeding, even if the act was commit-
ted prior to reaching the age of majority. 2
Parental responsibility for acts committed by a juvenile was ad-
dressed legislatively through amendments to sections 8.01-43 and -
44, which raised the limit from $500 to $750 for damage to public
or private property caused by a minor child, and by the Virginia
Supreme Court's decision in Bell v. Hudgins.13 In that case the
court concluded that parents could not be held liable for the mali-
cious, intentional acts of a minor child in the absence of a princi-
pal-agent relationship. The court, speaking through Justice
Compton, declined the invitation "to establish in Virginia by judi-
cial decree a blanket rule which would impose civil liability upon
parents who fail to control their minor child's criminal behavior.54
The General Assembly, in a related matter, provided for the juve-
nile court's ability to order parents to pay for juveniles placed di-
rectly in a private program or institution by the court after a hear-
ing to determine ability to pay.15
11. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 6 Va. Cir. 373 (Frederick County 1986) (construing VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-228, -241, -242).
12. Op. Va. Att'y Gen. (October 17, 1986) (opinion to the Honorable Lawrence R. Am-
brogi, Commonwealth's Attorney for Frederick County). The reasoning of the opinion ap-
pears faulty as to the latter conclusion since the code provision relied on relates to the
retention or detention of a juvenile beyond the twenty-first birthday and not the exercise of
original jurisdiction.
13. 232 Va. 491, 352 S.E.2d 332 (1987).
14. Id. at 494, 352 S.E.2d at 334.
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-286(A) (Cum. Supp. 1987). This section of the code gives juve-
nile courts some flexibility in addressing the particular needs of a child outside of the range
offered by public programs. Unfortunately, the funds appropriated each year by the General
Assembly are seldom sufficient, and this legislation apparently tries to address this
difficulty.
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In United States v. Juvenile Male,' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that the 1984 amendments to
the federal Juvenile Delinquency Act 17 could not be applied retro-
actively. The court refused to allow the prosecution of a minor as
an adult when the acts in question were committed in 1981 while
the child was fifteen, even though he was not charged until 1986.
Such action would violate the ex post facto clause of article I, sec-
tion 9 of the United States Constitution.
II. CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION
A. Interstate Custody Disputes
The proper handling of interstate custody disputes still poses a
vexatious problem for state and federal courts. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and a district court in Vir-
ginia both had to deal with the role of the federal judiciary in
resolving the validity of competing state custody decrees under the
federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA).18 In Hickey
v. Baxter,9 the Fourth Circuit reiterated its 1981 holding in Doe v.
Doe20 that federal habeas corpus does not lie between private par-
ties to determine the custody of a child, but the court concluded
that the traditional "domestic relations exception" to federal di-
versity jurisdiction does not bar a proceeding under the PKPA to
enforce a custody order of a state court with proper jurisdiction.2
In the later case of Meade v. Meade,22 the court became somewhat
more bold, asserting that the PKPA empowered the federal courts
to act as a "referee" between states with competing and conflicting
custody decrees. The Fourth Circuit thus joined with a majority of
circuits that hold the PKPA to have reposited jurisdiction in the
federal courts to resolve interstate custody disputes. 3 In Maxie v.
16. No. 86-5615 (4th Cir. May 26, 1987).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (Supp. II 1984).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982) [hereinafter PKPA].
19. 800 F.2d 430 (4th Cir. 1986).
20. 660 F.2d 101 (4th Cir. 1981).
21. 800 F.2d at 431. The court did suggest that the district court might choose to return
the case to a Virginia juvenile and domestic relations district court to resolve the dispute
under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-125 to -146 (Repl.
Vol. 1983).
22. 812 F.2d 1473 (4th Cir. 1987).
23. The United States Supreme Court has awarded certiorari in a case from the Ninth
Circuit holding to the contrary. Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547 (9th Cir. 1986), cert.
granted, 107 S. Ct. 946 (1987).
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Fernandez,24 the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia exercised jurisdiction under the PKPA to resolve a
custody dispute involving conflicting decrees from the District of
Columbia and Virginia.
Even the United States Supreme Court got into the act in a
somewhat unusual twist on the normal setting for an interstate
child custody contest. In California v. Superior Court of Califor-
nia,25 the Court dealt with a request for extradition of a California
father by the state of Louisiana to answer a charge of parental kid-
napping flowing from the father's use of "self-help" to seize his
minor children and return them to California where he had a de-
cree awarding him custody. The father sought to challenge the va-
lidity of the Louisiana custody decree and the ensuing criminal
charge in the extradition proceeding. The Court concluded that
this was not a proper forum to challenge the decree, as the only
inquiry should be whether the requirements of the Extradition Act
had been met on the face of the documents.
In another unusual case the federal district court in Alexandria
ruled in McMurtry v. Brasfield26 that the civil provisions of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)27 did
not apply to the removal of a child from one state to another in
connection with a custody dispute.
The General Assembly enacted a new parental kidnapping act
making it a Class 6 felony to withhold a child from the custodial
parent in violation of a court order, if the withholding occurs in
another state.28 In the case of In re Johnston,29 the Virginia Court
of Appeals concluded that a writ of prohibition would not lie to
bar a juvenile and domestic relations district court from hearing a
petition for a change of custody and reconsidering a sister state's
custody decree. The issue of the juvenile court's jurisdiction in-
cludes questions of fact as well as law, and appeals may be taken
from any adverse decision if the forum is not proper for adjudicat-
ing custody. Three recently reported circuit court decisions con-
clude that under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA): (1) a Virginia court will decline to accept jurisdiction
24. 649 F. Supp. 627 (E.D. Va. 1986).
25. 107 S. Ct. 2433 (1987).
26. 654 F. Supp. 1222 (E.D. Va. 1987).
27. 18 U.S.C. 1964(c) (1982).
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-49.1 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
29. 3 Va. App. 492, 350 S.E.2d 681 (1986).
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over custody where a foreign court is a more convenient forum; °
(2) where only Virginia residents contest the custody of a child, a
Virginia court can entertain the case even though there is an out-
standing custody decree from another state;3 ' and (3) a Virginia
court will decline jurisdiction to hear a custody matter where an-
other state has a closer connection with the children.3 2 The Vir-
ginia Court of Appeals further clarified the Virginia rule in a case
where the custodial parent wishes to move from the state, making
the noncustodial parent's exercise of visitation difficult. In
Scinaldi v. Scinaldi,3 3 the court overturned an injunction forbid-
ding the mother from moving the children's residence from the
Tidewater area, stating that the focus should be on "the best inter-
ests of these children" and whether the benefit of a close relation-
ship with both parents "is available to the child only if he or she
lives in close proximity to the non-custodial parent. 34
B. The "Maternal Preference Rule"
The continued vitality of the "maternal preference rule" remains
an issue despite numerous legislative efforts to bury it. 5 In Visi-
kides v. Derr,8 the Virginia Court of Appeals tried to put the
"rule" or "presumption" or "inference" to death forever. The trial
court had changed custody from the father to the mother and
based that decision in part on the fact that the child was of
"tender years" and should be with her mother, all other things be-
ing equal. The Virginia Court of Appeals said that "it is clear that
any use of such an inference in determining what is in the best
interests of the child is reversible error. ' 37 The court also indicated
that the process of determining whether a change of custody is ap-
propriate involved "a two-pronged test: (1) whether there has been
a change in circumstances since the most recent custody award;
and (2) whether a change in custody would be in the best interests
of the child."38
30. Dalot v. Dalot, 6 Va. Cir. 18 (Norfolk 1982).
31. Wise v. Cowley, 6 Va. Cir. 334 (Norfolk 1986).
32. In re Cumbie, 8 Va. Cir. 443 (Roanoke 1987). The court's opinion is quite well-
researched and is very sensitive to the policies behind the UCCJA.
33. 2 Va. App. 571, 347 S.E.2d 149 (1986).
34. Id. at 575, 347 S.E.2d at 150-51.
35. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2 (Cum. Supp. 1987); id. § 31-15 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
36. 3 Va. App. 69, 348 S.E.2d 40 (1986).
37. Id. at 72, 348 S.E.2d at 42.
38. Id. at 70, 348 S.E.2d at 41 (citation omitted).
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In Ferris v. Underwood,39 the custody contest was between the
mother and the paternal grandmother. At the time of the parents'
divorce, the child was living with the grandmother. Later, the
mother petitioned for custody. The divorce decree was silent as to
custody. The court held that these circumstances did not deprive
the mother of the parental presumption to custody and the burden
of proof should have been placed on the grandmother.
In Turner v. Turner,0 the trial court did not err in transferring
custody from the father to the mother when her life stabilized
through remarriage, the child expressed a preference to live with
her mother, and two experts recommended placement with the
mother. One judge dissented, finding the evidence of material
change of circumstances to be insufficient.41
C. Termination of Visitation Rights
In Fariss v. Tsapel,42 the Virginia Court of Appeals indicated
that where a reduction or termination of visitation rights is sought,
reasonable notice should be given to the parent.43 The court also
noted that a social worker's testimony based on a home visit held
two years before the hearing and two months prior to the entry of
visitation decree was not germane to the present inquiry, and the
absence of a transcript of the judge's in camera discussions with
the children made it impossible for the appellate court to consider
matters relied upon therein by the trial court.44
In M.E.D. v. J.P.M.,45 the Virginia Court of Appeals dealt with a
difficult case where allegations of sexual abuse during visitation
were levelled at the non-custodial father. The court concluded that
the trial judge had unduly restricted the admission of evidence rel-
39. 3 Va. App. 25, 348 S.E.2d 18 (1986).
40. 3 Va. App. 31, 348 S.E.2d 21 (1986).
41. Id. at 38, 348 S.E.2d at 24-25 (Duff, J., dissenting).
42. 3 Va. App. 439, 350 S.E.2d 670 (1986).
43. Id. (construing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-127 (Repl. Vol. 1983)).
44. Virginia appellate court decisions give little guidance concerning in camera interviews
of children by a trial judge. In M.E.D. v. J.P.M., 3 Va. App. 391, 350 S.E.2d 215 (1986), the
trial court did not err in declining an invitation to conduct an in camera interview where no
formal offer was made, and the offering party declined to call the child as a witness. In
Miller v. Miller, No. 820159 (Va. 1983), the Virginia Supreme Court issued some guildelines
in a memorandum opinion which was not published and which "may not be cited or relied
upon as precedent in future cases." The court said that such an interview may be held over
the objection of a party, and it observed that no record existed of the evidence adduced in
camera because the parties failed to ask that one be made. Id.
45. 3 Va. App. 391, 350 S.E.2d 215; see also supra note 44.
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evant to the charge and used visitation as a weapon to punish the
custodial parent for making such allegations.
III. ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER CARE AND TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS
A. Abuse and Neglect
The most distressing aspect of this subtopic is that a total of
seven Virginia Court of Appeals criminal cases during the past
year address prosecutions for the sexual abuse of children, a
marked increase in the number of reported cases of this nature
over previous years.4 Consequently, legislative efforts to deal with
sexual abuse by child-care providers and others have continued.
The troublesome issue of facilitating the taking of evidence from
child victims was addressed only through the 1987 enactment of a
bill allowing the use of a videotape deposition of a victim through
stipulation by the parties.47 A joint legislative subcommittee cre-
ated to study the hearsay rule and the videotaping of testimony
used in child sexual abuse cases and make its recommendations to
the 1988 session.48
46. In Tharrington v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 491, 346 S.E.2d 337 (1986), the court
sustained the sufficiency of the evidence for attempted aggravated sexual battery of an
eleven-year-old friend of the defendant's daughter. In Marlowe v. Commonwealth, 2 Va.
App. 619, 347 S.E.2d 167 (1986), the court affirmed convictions for enticement and aggra-
vated sexual battery of two girls, age ten and age nine, despite some uncertainty about
dates. In Cantwell v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 606, 347 S.E.2d 523 (1986), three convic-
tions of indecent exposure to a child were affirmed. The court in Chrisman v. Common-
wealth, 3 Va. App. 89, 348 S.E.2d 399 (1986), reversed convictions for various sexual offenses
involving children because of the erroneous admission for impeachment purposes of defend-
ant's prior conviction for indecent exposure. See also Bacigal, Criminal Procedure: Annual
Survey of Virginia Law, 21 U. RICH. L. REv. 727, 740 (1987). In Clinebell v. Commonwealth,
3 Va. App. 362, 349 S.E.2d 676 (1986), the court affirmed defendant's convictions for sexu-
ally assaulting his minor daughter even though the trial court excluded "expert" testimony
that the daughter suffered from hysteric amblyopia. The trial court had also refused to hear
testimony of specific prior incidents where the daughter was alleged to have made false
accusations of sexual misconduct. The court upheld sexual abuse convictions in Chrisman v.
Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 371, 349 S.E.2d 899 (1986), but a sodomy conviction was over-
turned because of insufficient evidence of penetration of the victim's vagina by defendant's
tongue. In Bridgeman v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 523, 351 S.E.2d 598 (1986), a conviction
for incest was overturned because the results of HLA blood tests alone were insufficient to
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
47. Act of March 26, 1987, ch. 448 1987 Va. Acts 577 (amending VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67,
adopting § 18.2-67.01 and requiring reenactment by the 1988 Assembly Session to become
effective).
48. H.J. Res. 319, 1987 Virginia General Assembly.
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Other legislation added the rental of sexually explicit material to
the proscribed activities in the child obscenity law,4 9 and provided
that statements made to a child protective services worker by a
person arrested for child abuse or neglect cannot be admitted into
evidence unless the accused was advised of his or her constitu-
tional rights beforehand. 0 Two other bills provided that a teacher
may be suspended when charged with a sexual offense involving a
child,51 and that the making of a materially false statement con-
cerning conviction of a sexual offense involving a child on a teacher
employment application will be a Class 1 misdemeanor and
grounds for the revocation of the certificate to teach.2 Three bills
addressed the use of preliminary protective orders in child or
spousal abuse cases in juvenile and domestic relations district
courts. 3 The legislature also addressed the dissemination of crimi-
nal history information to regulators of child-care providers and
proscribed the hiring of employees or use of volunteers by child-
care providers when the persons have been convicted of certain
offenses. 4
The United States Supreme Court held in Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie55 that confidential protective service agency files concern-
ing an investigation into suspected child abuse and neglect are not
wholly discoverable by defense counsel in a criminal prosecution of
the alleged abuser. However, the trial court may be obligated to
review the files in camera for the presence of exculpatory evidence
or other material relevant to the defense of the charges. In Com-
monwealth v. Stincer,56 Justice Scalia denied an application for
stay of a Kentucky Supreme Court decision which held that an
accused child-molester has a right to be present at the hearing in-
quiring into the competency of his child victim to testify. Even
though Justice Scalia doubted the validity of the Kentucky court's
conclusion, since the Kentucky legislature had adopted later legis-
lation contrary to the decision and since he was unaware of any
49. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-391 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
50. Id. § 63.1-248.6(G).
51. Id. § 22.1-315.
52. Id. § 22.1-296.1.
53. Id. §§ 16.1-244, -253, -253.1, -253.2, -279.1 (relating to preferential docket treatment
for hearings on such orders, the conditions that may accompany such an order, and allowing
prosecution for trespass in addition to contempt for entering on to premises in violation of a
protective order).
54. Id. §§ 19.2-389, 63.1-197, -198.1, -198.2, -199.
55. 107 S. Ct. 1519 (1987).
56. 107 S. Ct. 7 (1986).
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other state having rendered a similar decision, there was no rea-
sonable probability that four Justices would vote to grant
certiorari.
Finally, in M.E.D. v. J.P.M.5 7 the Virginia Court of Appeals con-
cluded that a trial court improperly restricted the admission of evi-
dence in a hearing to determine whether to terminate visitation by
a father who was accused of sexually abusing his child during ear-
lier periods of visitation. While noting that a young child may un-
derstand intervals of time differently than an adult, the court ac-
knowledged that cases involving the res gestae exception to the
hearsay rule indicate that the absence of temporal precision
removes the child's statements from the scope of the exception."
The court did conclude that the psychiatrists and psychologists
should be allowed to rely on the child's statements as a basis for
their expert opinions, and the statements would be admissible
under the "state of mind" exception to the hearsay rule as affect-
ing the child's reluctance to engage in visitation." The trial court
also erred in excluding the rebuttal testimony of a clinical social
worker regarding the interpretation of psychological tests.60
B. Foster Care and Termination of Parental Rights
Legislation adopted at the 1987 session of the General Assembly
requires a court to make a finding at the conclusion of a foster care
review hearing as to whether reasonable efforts have been made to
reunite the child with his or her parents, if applicable.6 1 In addi-
tion, the code now provides that where a child is in foster care by
court commitment, entrustment, or by voluntary relinquishment,
termination of parental rights may take place if the parents have
been unwilling or unable to remedy the problems, within a reason-
able time "not to exceed twelve months," and requiring the social
service agency to submit a written plan for finding a permanent
placement for the child within six months after termination of the
parents' rights.2
57. 3 Va. App. 391, 350 S.E.2d 215; see also supra note 44.
58. 3 Va. App. at 400, 350 S.E.2d at 221 (citing Pepoon v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 804,
811, 66 S.E.2d 854, 858 (1951)).
59. 3 Va. App. at 400-01, 350 S.E.2d at 221-22.
60. Id. at 403-04, 350 S.E.2d at 223.
61. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-282 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
62. Id. § 16.1-283.
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In Robinette v. Keene,3 the Virginia Court of Appeals reversed
the termination of a mother's parental rights and the adoption of
the children by another, holding that the evidence of the mother's
abandonment of the children was insufficient. After the mother
learned that her husband had sexually abused one of their children
and was threatening to kill the mother, she left home with the two
children.
The termination of parental rights of a mentally ill mother was
upheld in Barkey v. Alexandria Department of Human Services, 4
where the mother had refused treatment for her mental illness,
had failed to maintain contact with her child or plan for the child's
future, and where the child's development improved markedly
while in foster care. In Martin v. Pittsylvania County Department
of Social Services,"5 the court affirmed an order denying custody to
a mentally retarded mother who was deemed incapable of caring
for the child by herself, but reversed for lack of jurisdiction the
order of permanent foster care where no petition had been filed
requesting it. In another Virginia Court of Appeals case, it was de-
cided that where a child's natural mother knows the identity of the
father, but refuses to reveal his identity, notice by order of publi-
cation must be given to the unknown father before his rights may
be terminated.6
IV. CHILD SUPPORT AND PATERNITY
A. Child Support
The General Assembly adopted several bills in 1987 dealing with
child support and its enforcement, many of them stemming from
the delay in payments through the Virginia Department of Social
Services. These bills: (1) provide that juvenile court venue shall be
the same in child support and spousal support cases;67 (2) bar ret-
roactive modification of support awards but permit modification
during any period in which a petition for modification is pending,
63. 2 Va. App. 578, 347 S.E.2d 156 (1986).
64. 2 Va. App. 662, 347 S.E.2d 188 (1986).
65. 3 Va. App. 15, 348 S.E.2d 13 (1986).
66. Augusta County Dep't of Social Servs. v. Unnamed Mother, 3 Va. App. 40, 348 S.E.2d
26 (1986). Judge Benton dissented on the ground that notice by publication would be inade-
quate and thus the mother should retain responsibility for the child if she will not reveal the
father's identity. Id. at 47, 348 S.E.2d at 30 (Benton, J., dissenting).
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-243 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
1987]
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but only from the date of notice;"" (3) modify the provisions in
various ways relating to the support enforcement system;6" (4) pro-
vide for the payment of interest by the Department of Social Ser-
vices where there is a delay of more than thirty days following the
end of the month in which the payment was received;7 0 and (5)
provide for the payment of interest at the judgment interest rate
by an arrearage obligor.7'
In Rose v. Rose, 2 the United States Supreme Court concluded
that a state court has jurisdiction to hold a disabled veteran in
contempt of court for failing to make child-support payments, even
though the only means available to pay the support is disability
benefits from the United States Veterans' Administration. The
court in reaching this conclusion rejected an argument of federal
preemption under the supremacy clause of article VI of the United
States Constitution. Also, in Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock,73 Jus-
tice O'Connor granted a stay of a California Court of Appeals order
granting habeas corpus relief to a father held in civil contempt for
failure to make child support payments because of a statute shift-
ing the burden of proof to the contemnor. Justice O'Connor con-
cluded that it was likely that certiorari would be granted and that
the state would prevail on the merits.
The Virginia Supreme Court ruled in Edwards v. Lowry7 4 that
an ex-husband was not entitled to a reduction in child support af-
ter being discharged from employment for theft from his employ-
ers or because he incurred increased expenses through remarriage
and the assumption of additional responsibilities for his new fam-
ily. The court also awarded attorneys' fees to the wife for defend-
ing the numerous proceedings brought to reduce child support.75 In
Hausman v. Hausman,6 the Virginia Supreme Court concluded
that a lien for child support docketed after divorce had priority
over a recorded deed of trust on the marital home executed solely
by the husband prior to divorce.
68. Id. §§ 16.1-279, 20-74, -88.28:2, -88.30:6, -108, -112 (Cum. Supp. 1987); id. § 63.1-252.1
(Repl. Vol. 1987).
69. Id. §§ 20-60.3, -60.5, -78.1, -79.1, -88.29:1, -107.2, (Cum. Supp. 1987); id. §§ 63.1-249,
-250.3, -252.1, -256, -267.1, -268.1 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
70. Id. § 20-60.5 (Cum. Supp. 1987); id. § 63.1-250.1:1 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
71. Id. § 20-78.2 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
72. 107 S. Ct. 2029 (1987).
73. 107 S. Ct. 259 (1986) (O'Connor, Circuit Justice); see also In re Feiock, 180 Cal. App.
3d 649, 225 Cal. Rptr. 748 (1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1367 (1987).
74. 232 Va. 110, 348 S.E.2d 259 (1986).
75. Id. at 114, 348 S.E.2d at 262.
76. 233 Va. 1, 353 S.E.2d 711 (1987).
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The Virginia Court of Appeals rendered a variety of child sup-
port decisions as well. In Young v. Young,77 the court concluded
that even if both parents earn about the same income, one parent
may be required to pay more than half of the support if the other
parent provides considerably more nonmonetary contributions to
the welfare of the child. The court upheld a trial court decision
concluding that a father had not unreasonably withheld his con-
sent to his daughter's enrollment at a boarding school in Harris v.
Woodrum78 where the parents' separation agreement included the
father's right to approve of the daughter's choice of schools.
In Rippe v. Rippe,9 the court concluded that a trial court could
not refuse to order child support simply because of strained rela-
tionships and antagonisms in the family. In another decision, the
court held that when a separation agreement provides unequivo-
cally for the payment of child support on a monthly basis for all
children of the marriage, the father cannot refuse to make such a
payment simply because one or more of the children was tempora-
rily in his custody. 0 In Lee v. Lee,"' the court reversed a trial court
for considering only factors that would be relevant to a motion to
reduce support due to changed circumstances when the hearing
was actually an initial child-support hearing. In the case of
Walthall v. Commonwealth,"2 the court determined that a com-
monwealth's attorney should not have appeared on behalf of the
ex-wife in a purely "civil" proceeding for increased child support.
In Williams v. Williams,8 3 the chancellor's consideration of child
support in making a monetary award under section 20-107.3 of the
Virginia Code 4 providing for equitable distribution was deemed
erroneous.
In Fry v. Schwarting,85 the court said that a property settlement
agreement incorporated by reference into a divorce decree may be
enforced by contempt. Furthermore, its provision which required
support until each child either reached the age of 21 or was "other-
77. 3 Va. App. 80, 348 S.E.2d 46 (1986).
78. 3 Va. App. 428, 350 S.E.2d 667 (1986).
79. 3 Va. App. 506, 351 S.E.2d 181 (1986).
80. Henderlite v. Henderlite, 3 Va. App. 539, 351 S.E.2d 913 (1987).
81. 3 Va. App. 631, 352 S.E.2d 534 (1987).
82. 3 Va. App. 674, 353 S.E.2d 169 (1987).
83. 4 Va. App. 19, 354 S.E.2d 64 (1987).
84. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
85. 4 Va. App. 173, 355 S.E.2d 342 (1987).
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wise emancipated" did not contemplate emancipation by the statu-
tory lowering of the age of majority."6 Therefore the support obli-
gation continued to age 21. Likewise, the Court of Appeals has
made it clear that neither party can contract away a child's right to
future support.87 The Circuit Court of the City of Lynchburg also
ruled that parents are legally responsible for the care and treat-
ment of their incompetent or incapacitated adult children.""
In three cases under the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforce-
ment of Support Act, it was held that: (1) a clause in a property
settlement agreement, providing that 35% of a husband's take-
home pay was to go to child support, referred to adjusted gross
income as it appeared on the federal income tax return, less social
security taxes and state and federal taxes; 9 (2) a husband's delib-
erate refusal to obey an order directing the payment of counsel
fees constituted contempt of court; 0 and (3) a social services
agency from another state may sue in Virginia to collect child-sup-
port payments where the parents reside in Virginia, even though
the children live in a third statef 1
B. Paternity
In Florence v. Roberts,92 the Virginia Supreme Court concluded
that in a civil support proceeding brought on behalf of an illegiti-
mate child, either party has the right to appeal an adverse pater-
nity determination made in juvenile and domestic relations district
court to the circuit court.
V. ADOPTION
The General Assembly enacted one amendment to the adoption
law by providing that no reference to the Department of Social
Services need be made where a petition for adoption is filed by a
natural parent or adoptive parent and his/her new spouse, and the
86. Id. at 180-81, 355 S.E.2d at 346.
87. Mabry v. Stewart, 8 Va. Cir. 69 (Warren County 1983).
88. Department of Mental Health v. Miller, 7 Va. Cir. 354 (Lynchburg 1986).
89. Hederick v. Hederick, 3 Va. App. 452, 350 S.E.2d 526 (1986).
90. Frazier v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 84, 348 S.E.2d 405 (1986).
91. Henderson 'County Dep't of Social Servs. v. Lehman, 7 Va. Cir. 369 (Warren County
1986) (construing Virginia Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 20-88.12 to -88.31 (Repl. Vol. 1983 & Cum. Supp. 1987)).
92. 233 Va. 297, 355 S.E.2d 316 (1987).
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other parent is deceased.9 3 The General Assembly also clarified a
point raised in the Virginia Supreme Court's decision in Hyman v.
Glover,94 wherein the court concluded that the use of the term "is-
sue" in a will did not include adopted children. The statutory
amendment provides that the terms "issue," "children," "heirs,"
and similar words include adopted children while the words "issue
of the body" or "natural children" exclude such children. 5
The Circuit Court of Frederick County awarded an adoption
over the objections of the natural father, concluding that his con-
sent was being withheld contrary to the best interests of the
child.96 The court referred to the father as suffering from the "be-
get and forget" syndrome as he had failed to maintain contact with
the child and provided no support.97
VI. EDUCATION
A. Free Speech
The United States Supreme Court again defined the constitu-
tional rights of minors more narrowly than for adults in Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser.98 The Court upheld the disci-
pline of a public high school student for delivering a nominating
speech for a fellow student at an assembly which contained graphic
and explicit sexual metaphors. The Court distinguished the lewd
language used by Fraser from the wearing of armbands in Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District99 and con-
cluded that the expression in this case was entitled to less protec-
tion than the expression in Tinker.100
B. Education of the Handicapped
Several cases dealt with the educational rights of handicapped
children. In Robinson v. Pinderhughes,10' the Fourth Circuit Court
93. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-231 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
94. 232 Va. 140, 348 S.E.2d 269 (1986).
95. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-49.1, -66.5 (Supp. 1987); id. § 64.1-71.1 (Repl. Vol. 1987); see also
Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 21 U. RICH. L. REV.
857 (1987).
96. In re Adoption of Anglin, 8 Va. Cir. 356 (Frederick County 1987).
97. Id. at 358.
98. 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986).
99. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
100. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3166.
101. 810 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1987).
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of Appeals concluded that a section 1983 civil rights claim1 2 was
available to a handicapped child for the purpose of enforcing a
favorable decision by an administrative hearing officer when a
school system failed to implement the decision within the time
limits set by that officer. In Schimmel v. Spillane,'0 3 the Fourth
Circuit ruled that a school system was not obligated to pay for the
placement of a handicapped child in a residential placement that is
not approved as a school for handicapped children. The court also
determined that the appropriate statute of limitations for proceed-
ing to secure a court review of an adverse administrative ruling
would be the one-year period prescribed for civil actions0 4 and not
the more restrictive 30-day limitation set forth in the Virginia Ad-
ministrative Process Act. 105
The federal district court ruled in Linkous v. Davis'06 that par-
ents' unilateral decision to place a handicapped child in a private
school would not be an automatic bar to their seeking reimburse-
ment for the tuition from the public schools. In Spielberg v. Hen-
rico County Public Schools,' 7 the district judge concluded that
the schools violated the procedural due process rights of a handi-
capped pupil by resolving to place the youth in a program pro-
vided by the schools and remove him from a private residential
placement prior to the development of the Individualized Educa-
tional Program (I.E.P.). 0 8 The court also noted that the Henrico
County schools apparently adhered to the erroneous view that all
handicapped children may be given an appropriate education in a
daily program as opposed to a residential one.
In Doe v. Rockingham County School Board,0 9 the district court
ruled that suspending a handicapped child for disciplinary reasons
related to his handicap violated the Education of the Handicapped
Act.110
102. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
103. Nos. 86-3033, -3041, -3044 (4th Cir. 1987).
104. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-248 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
105. Id. § 9-6.14:16 (Cum. Supp. 1987); VA. Sup. CT. R. 2A:2 and 2A:4.
106. 633 F. Supp. 1109 (W.D. Va. 1986).
107. No. 86-0304-R (E.D. Va. 1987).
108. The I.E.P. is a written statement which must be developed for each handicapped
child by the schools and parents acting collaboratively. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1982); 34
C.F.R. §§ 300.342(b)(1), -.533(a)(4), -.552(a)(2) (1986).
109. No. 86-0009-H (W.D. Va. 1987).
110. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1485 (West 1978 & Supp: 1987).
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The Virginia Court of Appeals decided one case involving educa-
tion of handicapped children. In Martin v. School Board of Prince
George County,"" the court concluded that an emotionally dis-
turbed youth could be provided an appropriate program by the
public schools without resort to a" residential placement.
C. Curriculum
In Schwartz v. Highland County School Board,"2 the Court of
Appeals ruled that it had no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal
from a circuit court's decision upholding a school board's denial of
a request for a religious exemption from compulsory school attend-
ance, as the local school board is not an "administrative agency"
under state law.
Three 1987 legislative enactments mandated the development of
a family life education curriculum by the State Board of Educa-
tion n1 3 and addressed the need for stronger educational programs
in juvenile institutions such as detention homes.11 4
VII. MISCELLANEOUS
The 1987 session of the General Assembly also enacted legisla-
tion which: (1) provided that a juvenile and domestic relations dis-
trict court may enter pendente lite orders in matters referred to it
by a circuit court;11 5 (2) revised the venue statute governing juve-
nile courts; 16 (3) provided that the Department of Social Services
may charge a fee for conducting an investigation in child custody,
support and visitation cases; and (4) authorized an attorney to
file a noncriminal petition on behalf of a client in juvenile court
without going through intake.118
In Hurdle v. Currier,'9 the circuit court concluded that a court
of equity had the jurisdiction to approve organ transplants from
infant donors and that it will do so when the parents, the donor
111. 3 Va. App. 197, 348 S.E.2d 857 (1986).
112. 2 Va. App. 554, 346 S.E.2d 544 (1986).
113. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-207.1 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
114. Id. §§ 22.1-209.2, -343.
115. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-243, -279 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
116. Id. § 16.1-243.
117. Id. §§ 14.1-114, 16.1-274, 63.1-236.1.
118. Id. § 16.1-260.
119. 5 Va. Cir. 509 (Arlington County 1977).
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and the donee have maturely considered the problems and the
risks associated with the procedure. In O'Brien v. O'Brien,'20 the
court determined that when a circuit court referred future ques-
tions of custody, visitation and support to a juvenile court and no
appeal is taken from a final decision, the circuit court will not re-
consider those matters when it decides the issue of divorce.
120. 7 Va. Cir. 26 (Henrico County 1980).
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